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Abstract
This Note will examine three factors that undermine the guarantees of freedom of movement
and freedom of establishment. First, the term public policy cannot be precisely defined. Second,
European Economic Community (Community) law fails to substantially limit the scope of the
public policy exception. Third, the Community legal system is inadequate to prevent or reverse
discriminatory acts of national authorities against Community workers. This Note will suggest
viable remedies for these problems. The proposals, if collectively implemented, would eliminate
discrimination of Community workers on the basis of nationality.
"PUBLIC POLICY" DISCRIMINATION IN THE EEC:
A PROPOSAL FOR ASSURING THE FREE
MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
INTRODUCTION
The Treaty establishing the European Economic: Commu-
nity' (EEC Treaty or Treaty) guarantees the free movement of
persons within the European Economic Community (EEC or
Community). 2  This guarantee extends only to persons en-
gaged in or pursuing economic activities: the EEC Treaty pro-
vides for the free movement of workers3 and the freedom of
1. Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) (official English
translation), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (unofficial English transaction) [hereinafter cited as EEC
Treaty]. On March 25, 1957, the EEC Treaty and the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community, March 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-11) (official English translation), 298 U.N.T.S. 169 (unofficial English transla-
tion) were signed. They are otherwise known as the Treaties of Rome. Both commu-
nities were modeled after the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2 (Cmd. 5189) (official English translation), 261 U.N.T.S. 140
(unofficial English translation). The European Economic Community (EEC) ex-
tended the European Coal and Steel Community's (ECSC) concept of a "common
market," providing for the free movement not only of coal and steel buli of all goods,
persons, and capital. See generally 1 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
EcONOMIC COMMUNITY P-1-27 (1984). To date, ten European nations belong to the
EEC. The original six nations were Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands. EEC Treaty, supra, preamble. The United Kingdom, Denmark
and Ireland acceded in 1973. Treaty of Accession, Jan. 22, 1972, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I); see SWEET & MAXWELL, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TREATIES 270
(unofficial translation) [hereinafter cited as SWEET & MAXWELL]. Greece joined the
EEC in 1979. Treaty of Accession of the Hellenic Republic, May 28, 1979, 22 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 9 (1979), 18 I.L.M. 897 (1979); see SWEET & MAXWELL, supra,
at 335. Spain and Portugal are scheduled to become members on January 1, 1986.
See Lisbon and Madrid Agree on Entering Common Market, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1985, at 1,
Col. 1.
2. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 1, 3(c).
3. Id. arts. 48-51. The principle guarantee of free movement of workers is in
article 48. This article provides:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Commu-
nity by the end of the transitional period at the latest.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimina-
tion based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of pub-
lic policy, public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance
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establishment.4 Freedom of establishment encompasses the
rights to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons
and to set up and manage undertakings. 5
These guarantees are not absolute. Articles 48(3) and
56(1) permit member states to impose different treatment on
nonnationals than nationals would receive under similar cir-
cumstances.' Such "special treatment" must be justified on
grounds of "public policy," public security, or public health.7
Public policy is the most vaguely defined of these three
exceptions. Interpretation has been left largely to the national
with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed
in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implementing
regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public
service.
Id. art. 48.
4. Id. arts. 52-58. Article 52 contains the basic guarantee of freedom of estab-
lishment. This article provides:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of
another Member State shall be abolished by progressive stages in the course
of the transitional period. Such progressive abolition shall also apply to
restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by na-
tionals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member
State. Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pur-
sue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertak-
ings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second par-
agraph of Article 58, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by
the law of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the
provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.
Id. art. 52. According to the construction of article 52, "[t]he right of establishment
dealt with in Article 52 . . . embraces all sectors of economic life; industry, com-
merce, finance, agriculture, public works, crafts, and the professions." 2 H. SMIT &
P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 2-538.
5. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 52. In the context of this Note, "workers" will
designate individuals qualifying under articles 48 and 52. "Freedom of movement of
workers" will encompass the principal of "freedom of establishment" as well.
6. Id. arts. 48(3), 56(1). Article 56(1) provides:
The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof
shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regula-
tion or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign na-
tionals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.
Id. art. 56(1). For text of article 48(3), see supra note 3. See infra notes 37-42 for a
discussion of exceptions to the requirement of national treatment.
7. EEC Treaty, supra note I, art. 56(1); see id. art. 48(3).
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authorities of each member state.' This makes it possible for
immigration officials of each state to hinder the free movement
of Community nationals based upon their subjective reading of
public policy.9
The discretion of national authorities to utilize the public
-policy exception must therefore be reduced. The necessity for
such action has been enhanced by the recent acceptance of
Spain and Portugal into the EEC.' One issue that contributed
to the delay of their acceptance concerned the free movement
of workers." The current member states feared that ex-
tending the principle of freedom of movement to Spanish and
Portugese workers would cause a great migration of foreign
labor into their territories 12 because both Spain and Portugal
are plagued by high unemployment.' 3 This posslibility con-
8. See van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1337, 1350, [1975
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at 7227. "[T]he particular cir-
cumstances justifying recourse to the concept of public policy may vary from one
country to another and from one period to another, and it is therefore necessary in
this matter to allow the competent national authorities an area of discretion within
the limits imposed by the Treaty." Id.
9. See, e.g., Leper v. Immigration Officer, Folkestone, No. TH/l 548/76, (U.K.
Imm. App. Trib. Mar. 30, 1977). The United Kingdom Immigration Appeal Tribunal
ruled that the probability that an EEC national would become a charge on public
funds justified refusing her entry on public policy grounds. Id. This ruling is suspect
given the exceptional nature of the "public policy" exception. See Goodwin-Gill, Or-
dre Public Considered and Developed, 94 LAW Q REV. 354, 357 (1978); infro text accompa-
nying notes 125-26; infra notes 145-68 and accompanying text. But se.' Giangregorio
v. Secretary of State, 38 COMMON MKT. L.R. 472 (U.K. Imm. App. Trib. 1983) (stating
that such a possibility did not rise to the level of a public policy consideration on
which expulsion could be justified). These cases illustrate not only the potential for
abuse, but the potential for inconsistent application of Community law. EEC Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 177; see infra note 177 and accompanying text.
10. See Lisbon and Madrid Agree on Entering Common Market, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29,
1985, at 1, col. 1.
11. Id. at 8, col. 1.
12. Europe, Agence Internationale d'Information Pour la Presse, No. 3458, at 6
(Oct. 4-5, 1982); see Opinion on Spain's Application for Membership, Commission of
the European Communities, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement
9/78, at 32 (1978).
13. See Donn~es Conjuncturelles et Structurelles: Comparaison avec I'Espagne
et le Portugal (Special Document), Commission of the European Communities,
March 1985 [hereinafter cited as Donn~es Conjuncturelles]. In 1984, Spain had
2,475,000 unemployed, id. at 12, out of a population of 38,400,000. Id. at 18. This
represented a change of 10.1% from the previous year. Id.'at 12. Portugal had
245,000 unemployed, id., out of a population of 10,100,000, id. at 18, representing a
change of 19.3% from the previous year. Id. at 12. Spain and Portugal have particu-
lar employment problems with regard to women and young people seeking jobs for
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cerned the current member states because the Community as a
whole faces serious employment problems.' 4 Spanish and Por-
tugese labor competing for scarce jobs could exacerbate un-
employment in the current member states. It is likely, in light
of the Community's hesitance to admit Spain and Portugal,
that member states will desire that job vacancies within their
respective territories are filled by their own unemployed work-
ers rather than those of Spain and Portugal. It is therefore im-
perative to substantially define the parameters of the public
policy exception so that national authorities cannot abuse it in
order to favor their own nationals.
This Note will examine three factors that undermine the
guarantees of freedom of movement and freedom of establish-
ment. First, the term public policy cannot be precisely de-
fined.' 5 Second, Community law fails to substantially limit the
scope of the public policy exception.' 6 Third, the Community
legal system is inadequate to prevent or reverse discriminatory
acts of national authorities against Community workers.' 7 This
Note will suggest viable remedies for these problems.' 8 The
proposals, if collectively implemented, would eliminate dis-
crimination of Community workers on the basis of nationality.
I. FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
The primary objective of the EEC is economic unity
among the member states.' 9 Underlying objectives include the
the first time. See Opinion on Spain's Application for Membership, supra note 12, at
17: Commission of the European Communities, Europe Information: External Rela-
tions, annex at 1 (Apr. 1982).
14. Economic and Financial Indicators, Focus: Jobs in Europe, Economist, Nov. 10-16,
1984, at 107; Donnes Conjuncturelles, supra note 13, at 12. In 1984, the total
number of unemployed in the Community rose to a record 12,665,800. Id.
15. See infra notes 50-87 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 89-142 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 169-206 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 145-68, 207-09 and accompanying text.
19. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2. Article 2 states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of eco-
nomic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stabil-
ity, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations be-
tween the States belonging to it.
Id.; see L. KRAUSE, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE UNITED STATES 4
(1968). By the 1950's, the advantages of economic integration were increasingly ap-
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elimination of barriers that divide Europe and the improve-
ment of the living and working conditions for the European
people. 20 Free movement of workers within the Community is
essential to realizing these goals. 2' The supply and demand of
labor is balanced by assuring the mobility of Community work-
ers.22 Thus, the Treaty effectively creates a supranational la-
bor market.2' Additionally, the free movement of workers pro-
motes integrated economic growth of the individual member
states and enhances employment opportunities and standards
of living for European nationals.24
The principle of the free movement of workers is based on
article 7 of the EEC Treaty, which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of nationality.25 Thus, a worker of a member state
residing in another member state must receive the same treat-
ment as would a national in like circumstances.26 In other
parent. Id. Technological developments necessitated enlarging the market so that
industries could operate efficiently. European firms operating in small, fragmented
markets were no longer competitive with large American firms. Economic integra-
tion was therefore sought as a means of expanding markets and protecting European
industries from United States products. Id.
20. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, preamble.
21. 1 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 2-454; see Regulation No. 1612/68,
11J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 257) 2 (1968), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1031 (pro-
viding for the freedom of movement within the Community).
Whereas freedom of movement constitutes a fundamental right of workers
and their families; whereas mobility of labour within the Community must
be one of the means by which the worker is guaranteed the possibility of
improving his living and working conditions and promoting his social ad-
vancement, while helping to satisfy the requirements of the economies of
the Member States ....
Id. preamble.
22. See 1 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 2-454; see also B. SUNDBERG-
WEITMAN, DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY: FREE MOVEMENT OF WORK-
ERS AND FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE EEC TREATY 128 (1977) ("from an
economic point of view it seems irrational that production in one place should be
hampered by a shortage of labour, when at the same time people in another region
are unemployed through a lack of jobs").
23. See 1 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 2-454.
24. Id.
25. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 7. Article 7 states in pertinent part: "Within
the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provi-
sions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohib-
ited." Id.
26. Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, 1235,
[1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, at 7779; 1 COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 1022.13, at 1026-27; 1 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 2-478.
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words, he must receive national treatment.2 7
The free movement of workers is a critical feature of the
EEC that must be upheld where appropriate. It is applicable,
however, only in cases involving Community law.28 Therefore,
member states are not precluded from restricting the move-
ment of their own nationals in purely domestic matters. 29 Con-
sequently, where the movement of national workers is re-
stricted, the movement of nonnational workers may also be re-
stricted in comparable situations because only national
treatment is required.3 o
27. 1 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 2-478.
28. See infra note 29.
29. In Regina v. Saunders, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1129, 1130, [1978-1979
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8558, at 8093, a citizen of the United
Kingdom pleaded guilty to a criminal charge in England. She agreed, in fact desired,
to return to her native country, Northern Ireland. Id. She further agreed not to enter
the territories of England and Wales for three years. Id. Saunders violated this
agreement. Before the English court brought another proceeding against her, it
asked the Court ofJustice whether the agreement derogated her right to free move-
ment as conferred by article 48 of the EEC Treaty. Id. The European Court ofJus-
tice stated that article 48 was inapplicable here. Id. at 1135, [1978-1979 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8558, at 8096.
The application by an authority or court of a Member State to a worker who
is a national of that same State of measures which deprive or restrict the
worker's freedom of movement within the territory of that State [Northern
Ireland being a part of the United Kingdom] as a penal measure . . . is a
wholly domestic situation which falls outside the scope of the rules con-
tained in the Treaty on freedom of movement for workers.
Id.
The authority of a state to restrict the mobility of its own workers is not limited
to criminal matters. For example, West German authorities had refused to admit one
of its own nationals to a teacher training course. Moser v. Baden-Wiirttemberg, 3
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14068 (June 28, 1984). The state reasoned that be-
cause the particular candidate was a member of the Communist Party, it could not be
assured of the candidate's loyalty to West Germany. Id. The candidate argued that
without this training, he would not be eligible for teaching positions in private
schools in Germany or other member states. Id. The European Court ofJustice con-
cluded that the candidate's claim that he might be hindered was hypothetical and that
it did not constitute a sufficient link with Community law. Id.
30. See I H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 1-60. "In many instances, .
nationals from other Community countries must be accorded the same treatment in
each Member State as that State accords its own nationals, but no more." Id.; see
Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 15-16, [1967-1970
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8056, at 7867. However, this equality
of treatment presupposes that nationals and nonnationals are in a comparable situa-
tion. See id. But see Italian Republic v. Commission of the European Communities,
1963 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 165, 177-78, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8014, at 7294 (differential treatment is not necessarily discriminatory
where the situations are distinguishable).
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II. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
Under the EEC Treaty, member states must follow an
open-door policy with respect to workers of other member
states.3 1 This interferes with the exclusive sovereignty of each
state to regulate its internal affairs.3" Prior to the dirafting of
the EEC Treaty, most European states implemented measures
to control the influx of foreign workers. National authorities
adopted policies whereby they could favor their own workers
over foreign workers and similarly favor foreign workers of a
particular national origin over others.34
Member states may no longer follow such selective prac-
tices with respect to nationals of other member states .35 How-
ever, the drafters of the EEC Treaty apparently intended to
reserve to the individual member states limited power to con-
trol its borders.3 6 Articles 48(3) and 56(1) provide public pol-
31. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 48(3), 52; supra notes 3-4.
32. See 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1002, at 1013; G. VAN DEN BERGHE, POLIT-
ICAL RIGHTS FOR EUROPEAN CITIZENS 24 (1982).
33. 1 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 2-453. During the depression of the
1930's, most European nations adopted measures to protect their national labor mar-
kets against the influx of foreign workers. Such measures were maintained until after
the Second World War. Id. As economic conditions gradually improved, nations
continued to protect their own workers but adopted less restrictive policies towards
foreign labor. The emphasis of national immigration policies changed from prohibit-
ing to regulating the flow of foreign workers. Id. Prior to the creation of the EEC,
national authorities discriminated against workers on the basis of their nationality in
two ways. First national authorities would ensure priority of national over foreign
labor. Id. This was achieved by estimating the need for foreign workers based on the
level of employment in a given region. Id. Employers would then be authorized to
hire the stated number of foreign workers. Id. Second, national authorities would
select workers on the basis of national origin. Id. Authorities would direct employers
to hire only a certain number of foreign workers from a particular country. Id.
34. See id.
35. See Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 21, arts. 1(2), 3(1), 4(1). This regu-
lation was created for the purpose of eliminating nationalistic selective practices. Ar-
ticle 1(2) states that any national of a member state "shall ... have the right to take
up available employment in the territory of another Member State witih the same
priority as nationals of that State." Id. art. 1(2). Article 3(1) provides that legal or
administrative action and practices of a member state are not applicable under the
regulation "where they limit application for and offers of employment, or the right of
foreign nationals to take up and pursue employment or subject these to conditions
not applicable in respect of their own nationals." Id. art. 3(1). Article 4(1) states that
"[p]rovisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action of the Member
State which restrict by number of percentage the employment of foreign nationals in
any undertaking, branch or activity or region, or at a national level, shall not apply to
nationals of the other Member States." Id. art. 4(1).
36. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 48(3), 56(1); supra notes 3, 6.
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icy, public security, and public health exceptions as the means
by which member states may differentiate between their na-
tionals and the nationals of other member states. 7 Where
such grounds exist, these exceptions allow national authorities
to discriminate on the basis of nationality. These reservations
do not violate article 7 of the Treaty. Article 7 states that the
prohibition on discrimination is not to prejudice any special
provisions contained in the Treaty;3 8 articles 48(3) and 56(1)
are such special provisions. 39 A host state need not impose on
a nonnational the same measures that would be imposed on a
national for the same conduct. 4° Member states may impose
special measures even though they might be more severe than
the penalty imposed on nationals for the same conduct. 41 Spe-
cial measures include denial of entry (exclusion), denial of is-
suance or renewal of residence permits, and expulsion.42
However, the method of treatment is the only distinction per-
missible based on nationality.43 Public policy is not a carte
37. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 48(3), 56(1); see supra notes 3, 6.
38. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 7.
39. See B. SUNDBERG-WEITMAN, supra note 22, at 14-15. "Article 7 cannot rea-
sonably be held to apply where these specific provisions were consciously worded in
order to restrict the scope of the nondiscrimination principle." Id. at 14. The
grounds of public policy, public security, and public health provided for in articles
48(3) and 56(1) are escape clauses which effect the scope of article 7. Id. at 15.
40. Saunders 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1135, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8558, at 8096. "[A] worker who is a national of another
Member State is subject to more severe treatment or is placed in an unfavorable
situation in law or in fact as compared with the situation of a national in the same
circumstances." Id.
41. Id.
42. See Directive No. 64/221, 7J. 0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 257) 64 (1964) (regard-
ing the coordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of
foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security, or
public health). Article 2(1) provides: "This Directive relates to all measures con-
cerning entry into their territory, issue or renewal of residence permits, or expulsion
from their territory, taken by Member States on grounds of public policy, public se-
curity or public health." Id. art. 2(1). The provision of special measures for nonna-
tionals might be predicated upon the principle of international law which precludes a
state from refusing its own nationals the right of entry or residence. See B. SUND-
BERG-WEITMAN, supra note 22, at 232. For a discussion of the effect of this principle
of international law on the free movement of workers, see van Duyn, 1974 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. at 1345-46, 1351, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8283, at 7225, 7228.
43. Adoui & Cornaille v. Belgium State, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1665, 1707,
[1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8840, at 7937.
The reservations contained in Articles 48 and 56 of the EEC Treaty permit
Member States to adopt, with respect to the nationals of other Member
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blanche to discriminate against nonnationals Where no genu-
ine policy has been offended.44 An activity that is legitimate
when exercised by nationals cannot be considered to adversely
affect the public policy of a state merely because the individual
performing it is a nonnational. 45 National authorities, as well
as the European Court ofJustice 46 (Court of Justice or Court),
do not consistently read the exception restrictively. Member
states define for themselves the meaning and scope of the
public policy exception. 47  Consequently, the reservation is
broader than was likely envisioned by the drafters.
Presumably, member states favor this ambiguity because it
permits them greater discretion. However, on numerous occa-
sions, national courts have requested the Court of Justice to
render a Community definition of public policy. 48 This indi-
cates that national courts need additional guidance in inter-
States and on the grounds specified in those provisions, in particular
grounds justified by the requirements of public policy, measures which they
cannot apply to their own nationals, inasmuch as they have no authority to
expel the latter from the national territory or to deny them access thereto.
Although that difference of treatment, which bears upon the nature of the
measures available, must therefore be allowed, it must nevertheless be
stressed that, in a Member State, the authority empowered to adopt such
measures must not base the exercise of its powers on assessments of certain
conduct which would have the effect of applying an arbitrary distinction to
the detriment of nationals of other. Member States.
Id.
44. See id.
45. See Rutili, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, 1225, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, at 7784 (observations of the Commission of the
European Communities).
46. The European Court ofJustice administers three bodies of Community law:
those of the ECSC, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the
EEC. Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Com-
munities, Mar. 25, 1957, § 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5.179-I), 298
U.N.T.S. 269; see SWEET & MAXWELL, supra note 1, at 231. "The Court of Justice shall
ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed."
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 164. See generally id. arts. 164-88 (outlining the struc-
ture and function of the Court of Justice).
47. See supra note 8.
48. See, e.g., Adoui, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1665, [1981-19:33 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8840; Regina v. Bouchereau, 1977 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1999, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8441;
Watson & Belmann, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1185, [1976 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8368; Jean Noel Royer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. I. Rep. 497,
[ 1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8359; Bonsignore v. Stadt K61n,
1975 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 297, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8298; Rutili v. Minister of the Interior, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, [1975
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preting and applying this concept in the context of articles 48
and 56.
A. Interpretation of "Public Policy"
The term "public policy" is derived from the French "or-
dre public. ' 50 Translators sometimes find "public policy" to
be an awkward translation. As a result, terms such as public
good,'5 public order 52 and breaches of the peace 5' have been
used interchangeably. This is not merely a matter of seman-
tics; these terms are not equivalent.54 Therefore, careless use
can lead to inconsistent decisions.
It has been suggested that because "public policy" is fre-
quently an inadequate translation of "ordre public," the latter
should be retained in English texts.55 While this suggestion
would provide for uniformity, it would not clarify the meaning
of "public policy." "Ordre public" is imprecise as well.
The scope of "ordre public" in French law is variable. In
its narrowest sense, "ordre public" refers to the avoidance of
disturbances affecting law and order and the preservation of
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322; van Duyn, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 1337, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8283.
49. See infra notes 94-141 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
51. See van Duyn, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1350, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at 7227. "Public good" is the broadest of these
terms. It encompasses all basic principles of a society. 2 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra
note 1, at 2-617; see also infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing the
meaning of public good in French law).
52. See Bouchereau, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2001, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8441, at 7949. In English law, public order has
a narrow meaning. It generally refers to the maintenance of peace and order. F.
RIDLEY & J. BLONDEL, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN FRANCE 160 (1969).
53. See Bouchereau, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. Rep.J. Rep. at 2001, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8441, at 7949; Bonsignore, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. at 307, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8298, at 7477.
This phrase also has a distinct and narrow meaning in English law. "Breaches of the
peace" designate criminal offenses. Bouchereau, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2024,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8441, at 7965 (Opinion of
the Advocate General).
54. See supra notes 51-53.
55. See 17 COMMON MET. L.R. 140, 153 n.4 (1976) (editorial comment to Rutili
v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1219, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, that 'ordre public' should be retained to avoid
confusion as to the meaning of the concept and to emphasize the unique quality of
it); see also Goodwin-Gill, supra note 9, at 354 n. 1.
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national security.56 This interpretation of "ordre public" was
adopted in article 224 of the Treaty.57 In this context, "ordre
public" is analagous to public security. However, it is unlikely
that the drafters intended such a narrow interpretation in arti-
cles 48 and 56 because a public security alternative is pro-
vided. 8
In French jurisprudence, such a narrow interpretation is
atypical. "Ordre public" is more commonly used in a broader
sense. For example, in French contract law, "ordre public" is
analagous to public good.59 Courts will strike down a private
agreement if the agreement is contrary to "ordre public" or
"bonnes moeurs" (good morals). 60  The latter term is re-
garded as an integral part of the former because respect for
morality is a matter of public policy. 6' French courts have used
these concepts to strike down contracts which were considered
threatening to one's well-being or to the institution of i-he fam-
ily.62 "Ordre public" is most broadly applied in the French law
of conflicts. 63 In this context, the term is analogous to public
policy. 64 Courts frequently refuse to apply foreign law on the
ground that its application would violate French public pol-
icy.65
Mere adoption of the term "ordre public" as used in
French law is therefore useless for purposes of interpretation.
However, reference to other international instruments con-
56. 2 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 2-616 to 617.
57. Id.; see EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 224. Article 224 states:
Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the
steps needed to prevent the functioning of the common market being af-
fected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take in the
event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and or-
der, in the event of war or serious international tension constituting a threat
of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of
maintaining peace and international security.
Id. (emphasis added).
58. 2 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 2-616 to 617.
59. Id. at 2-617.
60. R. DAVID & H. DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 135 (1958); 1 M.
PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW No. 293, at 202 (1959).
61. F. LAWSON, A. ANTON & L. NEVILLE BROWN, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW
169 (1967) [hereinafter cited as F. LAWSON]; 1 M. PLANIOL, supra note 60,. at 202.
62. See F. LAWSON, supra note 61, at 169-72.
63. R. DAVID & H. DE VRIES, supra note 60, at 134.
64. 2 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 2-617.
65. Id.
19851 457
458 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:447
taining the term "ordre public" can guide the interpreter of
"public policy."
The European Convention on Establishment66 utilizes the
concept of "ordre public." Its protocol provides:
The concept of ordre public is to be understood in the wide
sense generally accepted in continental countries. A Con-
tracting Party may, for instance, exclude a national of an-
other Party for political reasons, or if there are grounds for
believing that he is unable to pay the expenses of his stay or
that he intends to engage in a gainful occupation without
the necessary permits.6 7
This standard is unacceptable for the EEC Treaty. First, rather
than authorizing a broad interpretation, the Court of Justice
has repeatedly stated that the term is to be interpreted
strictly.68 Furthermore, the examples cited are inconsistent
with Community law for purposes of expulsion, or denial of
issuance or renewal of residence permits. 69 In citing these ex-
66. Dec. 13, 1955, 529 U.N.T.S. 142 [hereinafter cited as Establishment Con-
vention].
67. Id. protocol § 111(a).
68. van Duyn, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1350, [1975 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at 7227.
It should be emphasized that the concept of public policy in the context of
the Community and where, in particular, it is used as a justification for dero-
gating from the fundamental principle of freedom of movement for workers,
must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined unilater-
ally by each Member State without being subject to review by the institu-
tions of the Community.
Id.; see also Bouchereau, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2013, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8441, at 7957; Bonsignore, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. at 307, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8298, at 7483;
Rutili, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1231, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8322, at 7777.
69. The following discussion examines the applicability of the standards cited in
the protocol to the EEC.
1. Exclusion for Political Reasons: Although the Court has not specifically ruled on
this issue, it appears that political activity which does not pose a serious threat to a
fundamental interest of society, see Bouchereau, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1999,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8441, cannot justify an
expulsion of a Community worker. If the political activity concerns the exercise of
trade union rights, the state clearly cannot expel a nonnational merely on the basis of
such activity. See Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 21, art. 8 (prohibiting member
states from adopting measures which interfere with the exercise of trade union
rights); see also Rutili, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1235, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, at 7779. The French Minister of the Interior
determined that Rutili's presence in certain regions was "likely to disturb public pol-
1985] "PUBLIC POLICY" DISCRIMINATION 459
icy," apparently on the basis of Rutili's political and trade union activities. Id. at
1228, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, at 7776. The Court
cited a number of limitations on the powers of member states regarding the control
of nonnationals, including Directive No. 64/221, supra note 42, arts. 2-3 and Regula-
tion No. 1612/68, supra note 21, art. 8. It stated that these limitations taken as a
whole "are a specific manifestation of the more general principle, enshrined in Arti-
cles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms . . .and in Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 of the same Convention"
which permit restrictions in the interests of national security or public safety on the
rights secured by the above-mentioned articles only as are necessary for the protec-
tion of democratic interests. Rutili, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1232, [1975 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, at 7778.
Member states, however, may be empowered to regulate the political activity of
nationals of other member states if unrelated to trade unionism. There is nothing in
the Treaty to the contrary. Cf European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 16, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [herein-
after cited as Human Rights Convention] (expressly permitting contracting parties to
impose restrictions on the political activity of nonnationals). However, restrictions
that interfere with the free movement of workers would be inconsistent with Commu-
nity law. Watson, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1185, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8368 (certain restrictions may be imposed on nonnationals which
are not imposed on nationals provided that they are reasonable and do not create an
obstacle to the free movement of workers); see Rutili, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at
1226, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, at 7775 (observa-
tions of the Commission of the European Communities); cf Wooldridge, Free Move-
ment of EEC Nationals: The Limitation Based on Public Policy and Public Security, 2 EUR. L.
REV. 190, 196 (1977) (stating that German scholars hold that special measures, that
is, measures which restrict the free movement of nonnational workers, may not be
taken based solely on the individual's membership in or association with an extremist
political organization).
2. Exclusion for Inability to Pay Expenses of Stay: For a discussion cf cases that
concern EEC nationals becoming charges on the public funds of member states other
than their own, see supra note 9; cf Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 21, art. 7(1)
(requiring equality of treatment of EEC workers with regard to employment and dis-
missal); id. art. 7(2) (guaranteeing EEC workers residing in another member state the
same social benefits as received by nationals of the host state). These rights only
attach to those qualifying as workers, which, as defined by Community law, are those
who perform or intend to perform an activity of an economic nature. Levin v. Secre-
tary of State, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1035, 1051-52, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8821, at 7723. An EEC national retains his status as a
worker even if he becomes involuntarily unemployed. See Regulation 1612/68, supra
note 21, art. 7(1); see also Directive No. 68/360, 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 257) 13
(1968), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1035 (on the abolition of restrictions on
movement and residence within the Community for workers of member states and
their families). However, an individual might lose his "worker" status if he becomes
voluntarily unemployed. This casts considerable doubt upon the sincerity of his de-
sire to work. Giangregorio, 38 COMMON MKT. L.R. at 479 (U.K. Imm. App. Trib. 1983).
3. Exclusion for Failure to Obtain Necessary Permits: This criteria might stand up
under Community law if such permits were similarly required of nationals pursuing
the same occupation. However, employment of a nonnational EEC worker may not
be contingent upon discriminatory criteria. Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 21,
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amples, the protocol refers only to exclusion.7 ° Concededly,
such a standard is not as offensive when used for the purpose
of denying entry. 7' However, a standard that is not applicable
to all measures would make this issue of Community law even
more confusing.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 72 (Human Rights Conven-
tion) is another source that can be consulted. 73 Article 2 of
protocol 4 of the Human Rights Convention states:
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a state shall,
within that territory have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence.
3. No restrictions shall be placed on these rights other than
such as are necessary in accordance with law and are neces-
sary in a democratic society in the interests of national se-
curity or public safety, for the maintenance of "ordre pub-
lic," for the protection of health or morals, or for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others. 74
This provision is similar to article 48 and 56 of the EEC
Treaty.7 5 However, in order to derive the meaning of "ordre
public" in this context, comparison need be made with the
terms that appear in the body of the Human Rights Conven-
art. 6(1). Furthermore, EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 57 provides for mutual recog-
nition of certificates of qualification for specific occupations and professions.
70. See Establishment Convention, supra note 66, protocol § 111(a).
71. See infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
72. Human Rights Convention, supra note 69.
73. See Adoui, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1718, 35 Common Mkt. L.R. 631,
645 (Opinion of the Advocate General); Royer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 507,
[1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8359, at 7552 (view of the Com-
mission of the European Communities). These views assert that the Court, in deter-
mining the bounds to be observed when invoking the exception, must consider the
Human Rights Convention as it is ratified by all the member states and is an integral
part of Community law. However, the prevailing view is that the Human Rights Con-
vention serves only as a guide. See Wooldridge, supra note 69, at 190; see also Watson,
1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1207, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8368, at 7686 (Opinion of the Advocate General) (disagreeing with certain
scholars who read Rutili, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, as stating that the Human Rights Convention is
an integral part of Community law).
74. Human Rights Convention, supra note 69, protocol 4, art. 2.
75, Compare id. (providing for the free movement of workers under the Human
Rights Convention) with EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 48(3), 56(1) (providing for
the free movement of workers under the EEC Treaty).
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tion. For example, article 8(2) permits interference by a public
authority where one or more of the following interests necessi-
tates such interference: "national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of dis-
order or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 7 6 Save
for two points, this article and article 2 of protocol 4 are identi-
cal. The first distinction is that the latter does not provide that
economic reasons may justify a derogation of the protected
right.7 7 The second distinction is that whereas article 8(2) of
the Human Rights Convention refers to the "prevention of dis-
order,"'7 8 or stated affirmatively, the maintenance of order, ar-
ticle 2 of protocol 4 cites "the maintenance of 'ordre pub-
lic.' -79 If these terms are meant to be analogous, then "ordre
public" denotes public order. In fact, in article 6(1) of the
Human Rights Convention, "'ordre public" in the French ver-
sion is translated as "public order" in the English version.8 0
While other articles vary the form of the language somewhat,8 '
the notion of preserving the public order is inherent in all.8 2
The original 1957 English version of the EEC Treaty8 3
supports the conclusion that the literal interpretation of "or-
dre public" is "public order" rather than "public po]'icy. ' '" 4 In
this version, articles 48 and 56 permit derogations from the
basic principle of free movement of workers and fieedom of
establishment when "justified by reasons of public order, public
safety and public health."8 5
The flaw in this translation is that "public order" is of far
76. Human Rights Convention, supra note 69, art. 8(2).
77. See id. protocol 4, art. 2. Such a provision would be inconsistent with Direc-
tive No. 64/221, supra note 42, art. 2(2), which prohibits the invokation of such
grounds to service economic ends. Id.
78. Human Rights Convention, supra note 69, art. 8(2).
79. Id. protocol 4, art. 2.
80. Id. art. 6(1).
81. See, e.g., id art. 9(2) ("la protection de l'ordre" translated as "the protection
of public order"); id. arts. 8(2), 10(2), 11(2) ("la defense de l'ordre" translated as
"the prevention of disorder").
82. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
83. 298 U.N.T.S. 3. The official English translation, republished in 1973 at
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), substitutes public policy for public order.
Id. arts. 48(3), 56(1).
84. See 298 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 48(3), 56(1).
85. Id. (emphasis added).
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greater scope in French law than in English law. 86 Public order
in English law refers to the maintenance of the peace whereas
in French law public order means the general good order of
society. 7 "Public policy" might have been substituted for
"public order" to avoid misinterpretation. Although "public
policy" is an imprecise term, it is more akin to the meaning of
the French "public order."
It is therefore implausible to uniformly and precisely de-
fine "public policy." The problem remains as to how to reduce
the broad discretion left to member states in employing the
public policy exception. The solution lies not in directing
states how to interpret public policy, but in how to apply it.
88
B. Application of Public Policy
Community law provides little guidance as to how broadly
the public policy reservation may be applied. Its parameters
have been marginally narrowed by Council Directive No.
64/22189 and by preliminary rulings9" of the Court of Justice.
86. F. RIDLEY &J. BLONDEL, supra note 52, at 160.
87. Id.
88. See infra notes 89-168 and accompanying text.
89. Directive No. 64/221, supra note 42. For the principles set forth in Directive
No. 64/221 limiting the scope of the public policy exception, see supra note 42.
"Council" refers to the Council of the European Communities. It is a unified execu-
tive body of the EEC, ECSC, and Euratom. Treaty establishing a Single Council and
a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-11). The functions of the Council are set forth in article 145.
To ensure that the objectives set out in the Treaty are attained, the Council
shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty:
-ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the Member
States;
-have the power to take decisions.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 145. The Council carries out some of its tasks by
issuing directives. Directives are binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each
member state to which they are addressed. The national authorities may select the
form and method of implementing such directives. Id. art. 189. Directives are not
directly applicable to member states in that they are generally not self-executing.
However, even in the absence of implementing national legislation, directives have
direct effect and may be relied upon by individuals before national courts, van Duyn,
1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1348, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8283, at 7226-27. National courts must give precedence to directives where
national law is incompatible with the duties imposed by such directives. Watson, 1976
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1198, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8368, at 7680; Rutili, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1229, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, at 7777.
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1. Council Directive No. 64/221
The directive sets forth three rules for determining
whether a given measure against an EEC national is appropri-
ate. Article 2(2) states that such grounds shall not be invoked
to serve economic ends. 9 1 Article 3(1) states that measures
taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall be
based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual
concerned.92 Article 3(2) states that previous criminal convic-
tions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for ithe taking
of such measures.93 These rules represent important restric-
tions on the use of the exception. However, they are far from
comprehensive.
2. Case Law Analysis
The Court of Justice has been cautious in defining the
scope of the public policy exception. The Court was first
called upon to interpret article 48(3) and Directive No. 64/221
in 1978 in van Duyn v. Home Office. 9 4 Here, a Dutch national
sought entry into the United Kingdom where she was offered a
job as a secretary with the Church of Scieritology. ')5
Scientology, while not illegal, had been pronounced by the
90.The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Commu-
nity;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on .:he ques-
tion is necessary to enable it to give judgement, request the Court ofJustice
to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pend-
ing before a court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose ,decisions
there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall
bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
91. Directive No. 64/221, supra note 42, art. 2(2). This deliniation implies that
public policy grounds may be used to discriminate in furtherance of social, political
or other ends.
92. Id. art. 3(1).
93. Id. art. 3(2).
94. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1337, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8283.
95. Id. at 1340, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at
7221.
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British Government to be socially harmful.96 In an attempt to
curb the growth of this "pseudo-philosophical cult," 97 the gov-
ernment adopted a policy of denying entry to aliens employed
by or associated with the Church of Scientology.9" British citi-
zens were not similarly restricted. 99 Therefore, British sub-
jects were given preference over non-British workers.
The Court concluded that a member state could imple-
ment administrative measures to counteract certain activities
when performed by a nonnational even if such activity was law-
ful when performed by a national.' 00 It is not evident whether
the Court investigated the possibility of alternatives to exclu-
sion. It did not discuss whether incidental measures could
have been adopted and invoked against nationals and nonna-
tionals alike in order to discourage the practice of Scientology.
Instead, the Court readily affirmed the broad discretion of
member states to invoke the public policy exception.' 1 In
fact, the Court stretched such discretion beyond its permissible
limits.10 2
Subsequent rulings have been less lenient towards na-
tional authorities. In Jean Noel Royer, a French national had
been prosecuted in France for several armed robberies and
had been sentenced to two years imprisonment for procur-
ing. 103 He subsequently entered Belgium unlawfully. t '0 Bel-
96. Id. at 1339, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at
7220.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1339-40, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at
7221.
99. Id. at 1340, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at
7221.
100. Id. at 1351, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at
7228.
[Wihere the competent authorities of a Member State have clearly defined
their standpoint as regards the activities of a particular organization and
where, considering it to be socially harmful, they have taken administrative
measures to counteract these activities, the Member State cannot be re-
quired, before it can rely on the concept of public policy, to make such activ-
ities unlawful, if recourse to such a measure is not thought appropriate in
the circumstances.
Id. at 1350, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at 7227-28.
101. See id., [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at 7227.
102. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
103. 1976 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 497, 499, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8359, at 7546.
104. Id.
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gian authorities sought to deport Royer because he had failed
to comply with administrative formalities concerning entry.10 5
Here, the Court did limit the discretion of member states in
applying the exception. The Court held that the mere failure
to comply with certain administrative formalities is not severe
enough to constitute a threat to public policy. 10 6 Conse-
quently, such an infraction does not justify any measure which
restricts a worker's movement within the Community. Watson
& Belmann,10 7 decided in 1976, is in accord. Italian authorities
brought criminal charges against a British woman for failure to
report her presence within three days of her entry into Italy,
pursuant to a national regulation. 0 8 The regulation carried a
possible penalty of deportation, entailing a prohibition on re-
entry without special permission. 09 The Court held that such
reporting requirements were legitimate."10 However, the state
could not legitimately predicate a decision to expel upon the
mere failure to abide by such administrative regulations."'
Measures must be reasonable and proportionte to the gravity
of the nonnational's conduct" 2 and must not restrict the free
movement of workers. 1 3
In Bonsignore v. Oberstadtdirektor der Stadt K6ln, an Italian
worker residing in Germany bought a gun in violation of a fire-
arms law that required the possessor of a gun to obtain a per-
mit.' ' 4 Bonsignore negligently killed his brother while han-
105. Id. at 500, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8359, at
7546.
106. Id. at 514-15, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8359, at
7556.
107. 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1185, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8368.
108. Id. at 1186-87, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8368,
at 7672.
109. Id. at 1187, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8368, at
7672.
110. Id. at 1198, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8368, at
7680.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1199, [1976 Tranfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8368, at
7680.
113. Id. at 1198-99, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8368,
at 7680-81.
114. 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 297, at 298, [1975 Transfer Biiader] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8298, at 7477.
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dling the gun." 5 He was convicted but the local court deter-
mined that imprisonment would not be appropriate." 6
Bonsignore had acted negligently, not criminally and there was
no reason to believe that he would cause harm in the future." 17
Nevertheless, German authorities claimed that Bonsignore
posed a serious threat to the peaceful and secure coexistence
of the population." 8 A deportation order was issued on this
ground." 9 The Court ruled that a member state could not
deport an individual for the purpose of setting an example and
thus deter other foreign nationals from engaging in the same
conduct. 20 Nonnational treatment may not be imposed if the
purpose is of a general preventive nature.' 2 ' This ruling does
little more than reiterate the requirement set forth in Directive
No. 64/221 that measures taken on grounds of public policy
must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the indi-
vidual concerned.
The Court made its first significant attempt to restrict the
discretion of national authorities in applying the public policy
exception in Regina v. Bouchereau.' 22 A French worker was con-
victed of unlawful possession of drugs.22 The local court
made a recommendation for deportation. 124 The Court ofJus-
tice asserted that the mere perturbation of the social order is
not enough to trigger the public policy exception.125 Recourse
115. Id.
116. Id. at 299, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8298, at
7477.
117. See id. at 310, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8298, at
7482.
118. Id. at 300-01, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8298, at
7478-79.
119. Id. at 299, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8289, at
7477.
120. Id. at 307, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8298, at
7483. "Directive No. 64/221 prevents the deportation of a national of a Member
State if the deportation is ordered for the purpose of deterring other aliens, i.e., if it
is based . . . on reasons of a 'general preventive nature.' " Id.
121. Id.
122. 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1999, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8441.
123. Id. at 2001, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8441, at 7949.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2015, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8441, at 7957.
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to this concept by a national authority presupposes the exist-
ence of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the require-
ments of public policy affecting one of the fundamental inter-
ests of society.'1 6
The most recent case concerning the application of public
policy is Adoui & Cornaille v. Belgian State. 127 Two French wo-
men were employed in Belgium as barmaids. 28  They were
suspected of engaging in prostitution. 129 Belgian authorities
sought to expel them on the ground that their conduct was
harmful to the public policy of the state.' However, prostitu-
tion was legal in Belgium.'' The scenario is similar to that in
van Duyn. 132 In Adoui, the Court ofJustice ruled that a member
state could not justify special treatment of nonnationals in the
absence of a genuine public policy.' 33 The existence of a gen-
uine public policy necessitated that the state similarly impose
repressive measures upon nationals engaging in the same ac-
tivity.s' This conclusion is opposite to that reached in van
Duyn. 13 5  Nonetheless, the cases do not conflict. Van Duyn
states that where appropriate, a member state can impose meas-
ures on nationals of other member states even though no re-
strictions are imposed on its own nationals. 136 The underlying
theory was that the practice of Scientology could not be regu-
126. Id.
127. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1665, [1981-1983 Transfer Binider] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8840.
128. Id. at 1668-69, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8840, at 7912.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1706, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8840, at 7937.
132. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1337, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8283; see supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
133. 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1707-08, [1981-1983 Transfeir Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8840, at 7937-38.
134. Id.
135. 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1351, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET.
REP. (CCH) 8283, at 7228.
[A] Member State, for reasons of public policy, can, where it deems, neces-
sary, refuse a national of another Member State the benefit of the principle
of freedom of movement for workers in a case where such a nalLional pro-
poses to take up a particular offer of employment even though the Member
State does not place a similar restriction upon its own nationals.
Id.
136. See id.
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lated by other means because the legislature lacked the author-
ity to prohibit it. t3 7 The Court did not expound upon what
would be required of a member state where the circumstances
enable the member state to ban the activity. Such was the situ-
ation in Adoui.'38 Here, the Belgian Government had authority
to prohibit prostitution, yet it did not. However, certain inci-
dental activities such as solicitation and exhibition in shop win-
dows were prohibited."3 9 These prohibitions were applicable
to Belgian and foreign prostitutes. 40 If the plaintiffs had en-
gaged in such activities, an attempt to expel them on such
grounds might have been justified.' 4 1
In none of the above cases has the Court substantially lim-
ited the scope of the public policy reservation. Individual
states retain broad discretion to determine the circumstances
in which this exception may be invoked.142 Member states nev-
137. Id. at 1339, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at
7221.
138. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1665, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8840.
139. Id. at 1706, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8840, at 7937.
140. See id. at 1707, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8840, at 7937.
141. However, such was not the case in Adoui. The Court of Justice concluded
that Belgium's decision to expel the French prostitutes was inappropriate. Id. at
1708-09, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8840, at 7938.
Belgium argued that it sought to expel the women because it considered their pres-
ence harmful to public policy based on their possible contact with the French under-
world. The Court held that the national authorities must establish an actual link
between French criminals and each prostitute sought to be expelled. Id. No such
links were established. Belgium's policy against French prostitutes therefore consti-
tuted a measure of a general preventive measure within the meaning of Directive No.
64/221, supra note 42. Adoui, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1708-09, [1981-1983
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8840, at 7938.
142. One might speculate that the Court is reluctant to go any further than the
questions referred to it necessitate because of the traditional view that this concept is
best left to the discretion of national authorities. See supra note 8. However, there is
some indication that the member states themselves would not be adverse to limiting
their discretion to interpret and apply "public policy." In Rutili, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. at 1222-23, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, at
7772, the Italian Government submitted observations to the Court stating that it con-
sidered it "desirable that rules of a general and abstract nature adopted in the Mem-
ber States of the EEC should specify the grounds of public policy .... ." Id.; see
Bonsignore, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 316, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8298, at 7490 (Opinion of the Advocate General).
A more efficient solution, and one which would lead to better protection for
those workers referred to in Article 48 would clearly consist not in transfer-
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ertheless have a duty not to abuse the "public policy" excep-
tion. Although articles 48 and 56 do not expressly state so, a
good faith duty may be implied by analogy to article 36.14' Ar-
ticle 36 provides that "such restrictions shall not be used as a
means of arbitrary discrimination." Furthermore, aricle 5 re-
quires member states to "abstain from any measure which
could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this
Treaty."'' 44 The existence of this duty is not sufficient to as-
sure that member states do not abuse the public policy excep-
tion. The situations in which national authorities may invoke
the reservation must be limited. The first principle in limiting
the scope of public policy is that the policy must be actual. A
particular public policy cannot be arbitrarily adopted whenever
a national authority seeks to rid itself of an alien it considers
undesirable. 45 The policy must be duly promulgated' 46 and
the activity against which such policy is aimed must be equally
reprehensible when performed by a national. 147  Member
states must demonstrate a genuine commitment to discourag-
ing the offensive activity. Outlawing the activity or conduct is
strong evidence of a state's commitment but states need not
always go that far. 1 48 Alternatively, a member state could pro-
hibit or regulate activities incidental to the undesirable activity.
This course of action might discourage individuals from en-
gaging in the undesirable activity. Whatever means a state em-
ring to the Community institutions the security powers which the States
wished to retain and of which there is no question of depriving them, but in
strengthening the directive and rendering it more specific, in such a way that
the grounds for deportation would have to be based on Community criteria
which would be uniformly applicable.
Id.
143. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 36; see B. SUNDBERG-WEITMAN, supra note 22,
at 232-33.
144. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.
145. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text; cf. Directive No. 64/221, supra
note 42, art. 3(2) (special measures may not be invoked against a national of another
member state merely because he has a criminal record).
146. See van Duyn, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1350, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at 7228 (this is true "where the competent au-
thorities of a Member State have clearly defined their standpoint" on the given pol-
icy). Id.
147. See Adoui, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1707-08, [1981-1983 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8840, at 7934.
148. See van Duyn, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1350, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at 7228.
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ploys to curtail a particular activity, performance of such must
be punished or repressed regardless of who the actor is.' 49
The form and severity of the sanctions, however, may vary
based on national status.' 50
The exception should be limited to the measure of denial
of entry into the territory of a member state, save for ex-
traordinary circumstances. Two points militate against permit-
ting expulsion of Community nationals. First, such a measure
would presumably cause greater hardship to an individual who
has already established residence and has become assimilated
in the host state.' 51 Second, expulsion is inconsistent with the
objectives of the EEC. Expulsion is a weapon of self-defense
possessed by every sovereign state. 15  It is available to oust
nonnationals but not nationals.' 53 As a general rule, however,
no national distinction is drawn between workers of member
states. 54 Persons seeking or engaging in economic activities
may be regarded as losing their member state identity and ac-
quiring Community nationality. 55 For economic purposes,
their "nation" becomes the territory of the Community, which
ideally, contains no internal barriers dividing the European
states. 56 Therefore, expulsion of a Community national is in-
appropriate. Expulsion can only be applied in the interests of
the Community as a whole.5 v Local law is adequate in most
149. See Adoui, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1708, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8840, at 7937.
150. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
151. The distinction between expulsion and denial of entry might further ex-
plain why the Court was less bothered by the decision of the national authority in van
Duyn (denial of entry) than by the decision in Adoui (expulsion).
152. G. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
BETWEEN STATES 310 (1978); 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 620
(1967).
153. See van Duyn, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1351, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at 7228 (citing a principle of international law
which precludes a state from refusing its own nationals the right of entry or resi-
dence).
154. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
155. See G. VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 32, at 3. "Terms such as 'Community
citizen,' 'European citizen,' 'Market citizen' are . . . increasingly being used. All
these expressions are employed to describe individuals as being subjects of Commu-
nity law; all underline a certain relationship which exists between the nationals of the
Member States and European Communities as such." Id. at 3.
156. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
157. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 152, at 309.
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cases to punish or control the undesirable conduct.. 58 Given
the EEC Treaty's emphasis on national treatment for Commu-
nity nationals1 5 9 and the availability of effective sanctions, 160
the validity of expulsion is questionable.1 6 '
Availability should furthermore be restricted to employ-
ment related cases. In most of the cases referred to t:he Court
ofJustice, the conduct at issue was not employment related. 162
The public policy exception is more appropriately aimed at the
activity and not the individual. An individual who is engaged
in a legitimate economic activity plays an integral role in the
economic growth of the Community.1 63 He should be permit-
ted to remain in the territory of the host state and incur the
same restrictions or penalties as would be imposed on a na-
tional.' 64  This restriction on the use of the derogation would
better serve the principles and objectives of the European Eco-
nomic Community.16
5
Finally, the exception must be invoked only in extraordi-
nary circumstances where national treatment would not be ad-
equate.' 66 For instance, a member state should not be able to
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
160. See supra text accompanying note 158.
161. G. GoODWIN-GILL, supra note 152, at 309-10. Compare the approach used
with respect to the public health exception. Disease or disability may justify initial
refusal of entry but may not justify expulsion. Directive No. 64/221, supra note 42,
art. 4(1) states: "The only diseases or disabilities justifying refusal of entry into a
territory or refusal to issue a first residence permit shall be those listed in the Annex
to this Directive." Id. Directive No. 64/221, supra note 42, art. 4(2) states: "Diseases
or disabilities occurring after a first residence permit has been issued shall not justify
refusal to renew the residence permit or expulsion from the territory." Id. This re-
strictive approach should likewise be made applicable to the ground of public policy.
162. In fact, only in van Duyn and Adoui did national authorities attack the activi-
ties of the individuals in their capacities as "workers."
163. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note
158; infra note 166 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
166. See Watson, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1193, [1976 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8368, at 7677 (observations of the Commnission of the
European Communities).
In general terms, it is not sufficient that a measure is justified on grounds of
public policy; it must, in addition, be impossible for public policy to be safe-
guarded effectively other than by a discriminatory measure. This is (he case,
for example, where the different treatment applied to a foreign national as
compared with a national of the State concerned corresponds to a real dif-
ference in their factual situation.
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expel a national of another member state simply because he
commits a crime. 167 Sanctions provided by local law will gen-
erally be effective. Furthermore, other provisions in the
Treaty which enable member states to implement protective
measures in derogation of the objectives of the Treaty, stress
that "such measures shall cause the least possible disturbance
in the functioning of the common market and must not be
wider in scope than is strictly necessary. 68
III. INADEQUACY OF LEGAL REMEDIES
Neither national nor Community law can be relied upon to
prevent or reverse the discriminatory acts of national authori-
ties. 169 An individual against whom an order of expulsion is
sought, or who is refused entry, or the renewal or issuance of a
residence permit, has the same legal remedies as are available
to nationals challenging other acts of the administration. 70
However, the fact that the individual is afforded national treat-
ment does not guarantee that he will receive equitable treat-
ment.'
71
Articles 6 through 9 of Council Directive No. 64/221 set
forth minimal procedural safeguards for EEC nationals. 172
Where the national law of a member state does not provide a
right to judicial review of administrative decisions, such a deci-
sion against a national of another member state may not be
implemented before an opinion is obtained from a competent
authority of the host state. 73 A commonly utilized procedure
Id.
167. See Directive No. 64/221, supra note 42, art. 3(2).
168. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 109 (concerning the balance of payments); see
also id. art. 73 (concerning movement of capital); id. art. 226 (permitting member
states facing difficulties to apply to the Commission in order to implement protective
measures).
169. See infra notes 173-206 and accompanying text.
170. Directive No. 64/221, supra note 42, art. 8.
171. See infra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
172. Directive No. 64/221, supra note 42, arts. 6-9.
173. Id. art. 9. Article 9 provides:
1. Where there is no right of appeal to a court of law, or where such appeal
may be only in respect of the legal validity of the decision, or where the
appeal cannot have suspensory effect, a decision refusing renewal of a resi-
dence permit or ordering the expulsion of the holder of a residence permit
from the territory shall not be taken by the administrative authority, save in
cases of urgency, until an opinion has been obtained from a competent au-
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is to permit the individual concerned to appear before an advi-
sory committee, 7 4 which serves as the competent authority.1
5
This procedure is suspect, however, as the appointment and
membership of such committees remains in the hands of the
state authorities. 176
Nor is the individual in a substantially better position
where the national law does provide a right of appeal. Na-
tional courts have exclusive jurisdiction to apply Community
law within their own legal system.177 The Court ofJus:ice lacks
jurisdiction to review national court decisions.' 7 8
On the other hand, the Court of Justice has exclusive au-
thority to interpret Community law.' 79 It interprets the Treaty
and secondary legislation of the Community by issuing prelim-
inary rulings.' Only national courts may request preliminary
thority of the host country before which the person concerned enjoys such
rights of defence and of assistance or representation as the domestic: law of
that country provides for. This authority shall not be the same as that em-
powered to take the decision refusing renewal of the residence pe-mit or
ordering expulsion.
2. Any decision refusing the issue of a first residence permit or ordering
expulsion of the person concerned before the issue of the permit shall,
where that person so requests, be referred for consideration to the authority
whose prior opinion is required under paragraph 1. The person concerned
shall then be entitled to submit his defence in person, except where this
would be contrary to the interests of national security.
Id.
174. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 152, at 304.
175. Directive No. 64/221, supra note 42, art. 9. "[T]he directive does not de-
fine the expression 'a competent authority.' It refers to an authority which must be
independent of the administration, but it gives Member States a margin of discretion
in regard to the nature of the authority." Regina v. Santillo, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1585, 1600, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8677, at
8017.
176. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 152, at 304.
177. 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4656.02, at 3854.
178. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 173-82 (setting forth the jurisdiction of
the Court ofJustice); 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4656.01-.03, at 3854-56.
179. Simon & Dowrick, Effect of EEC Directives in France: The Views of the Conseil
D'etat, 95 LAw Q. REv. 376, 384 (1979); 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4656.01, at
3854. The Court alone may interpret Community law in order to assure uniformity.
If this function was left to the individual member states, the highest court of each
might interpret questions of Community law variedly. Id. "Diversity in interpreta-
tion would defeat the Treaty objective of establishing uniform norms for the entire
territory of the Community." Id.
180. See supra note 90 (discussing the Court of justice's jurisdiction to issue pre-
liminary rulings).
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rulings. 8' A national court may do so when it considers that a
Court decision on a particular question of Community law is
necessary in order to decide the case pending before it. 182
Where such a question is presented before a lower or in-
termediate court, the national court has the option of referring
it to the Court of Justice. 8 3 Where the question is before a
national court of last resort, referral to the Court of Justice is
mandatory." 4 However, this obligation is difficult to enforce.
Where the Court has not yet ruled on a particular question
of Community law, a national court can avoid its obligation to
refer such question by invoking the doctrine of acte clair.
Under this doctrine, a national court may claim that referral is
unnecessary because the answer to the question to be referred
is clear.185 If the answer is in fact uncertain, member states are
likely to interpret the issue of Community law variedly.' 8 6 This
would frustrate the aim of article 177 to provide uniform defi-
nitions of Community law.18 7
Where the Court has previously ruled on the question,
such as in the case of the public policy exception, a national
court need not refer the question for reconsideration. 8 How-
ever member states are not bound by every ruling of the Court
181. See 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4656.04, at 3856.
182. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177; see supra note 90 for the text of article
177.
183. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
184. Id. In either case, the national court proceeding is stayed pending the
Court ofJustice ruling. Thereafter, the national court must decide the matter in light
of the Court's interpretation. The Court of Justice is not authorized to apply its in-
terpretation to the facts of the case. 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4656.03, at 3855.
The state referring the question is bound by the Court's interpretation in deciding
that particular case. See Milch-, Fett-, & Eierkontor v. Saarbrucken, 1969 E. Comm.
Ct.J. Rep. 165, 180, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8096,
at 8373. However, Community law does not specify whether the ruling is binding in
future cases in the national courts of all member states. See infra notes 189-90 and
accompanying text.
185. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 5-479.
186. See supra note 179.
187. 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 5-479 to 480.
188. 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4656.06, at 3857. However, the Court of
Justice has stated that there is nothing to prevent a national court from referring a
question to the Court even though the same question has already been addressed in a
similar case. Id.; see Da Costa en Schakke N.V. v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration,
1963 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 31, 38, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8010, at 7239.
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of Justice.' 89 Some states voluntarily bind their authorities to
observe every Court ruling. 190 But where a state does not bind
itself to prior rulings, the potential for abuse of discretion ex-
ists. The Court has ruled, albeit cautiously, on the meaning
and scope of public policy on several occasions.' 9' A national
court which requires an interpretation of public policy in order
to render a judgment might refuse to refer the matter to the
Court. Technically, the national court does not violate Com-
munity law by so refusing. 192 However, unless the member
state binds its authorities to all prior rulings of the Court of
Justice, the national court may ignore prior rulings.19" The na-
tional court can thereby render its own interpretation of Com-
munity law to serve the particular ends of the member state. 194
Moreover, article 177 fails to provide sanctions against de-
linquent member states where a national court clearly disre-
gards its obligation to seek an authoritative ruling from the
Court. In this situation, as well as those previously discussed,
the individual concerned is left without legal recourse because
access to the Court of Justice is controlled by the national
courts. 195
189. See Simon & Dowrick, supra note 179, at 381. Article 177 is silent on
whether all member states and their authorities are bound by all preliminary rulings
of the Court ofJustice. Id.
190. Id. at 382.
191. See supra notes 94-141 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 189.
194. Even if the national court interprets the exception too broadly in order to
serve its own needs or prejudices, it is doubtful that such abuse wou[d fall under
article 169. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
195. 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4656.04, at 3856. Article 177 provides for a
preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Community law only at the re-
quest of the national court. Member states, Community institutions, and natural or
legal persons do not possess a similar right. Id. However, the Commission might
choose to pursue the matter on behalf of the aggrieved individual, or the proceedings
might be initiated by a single member state. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 170.
Under article 169, if the Commission determines that a member state has failed to
fulfill its Treaty obligations, "it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after
giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State
concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the
Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice." Id. art.
169. Under article 171, if the Court does find that the member state has failed to
fulfill its obligations, it may require the member state to take the necessary measure
to comply with the Court's judgment. Id. art. 171. A particular judicial action or
inaction on the part of a national court might constitute a failure by a member state
to fulfill a Treaty obligation. Compare Bouchereau, 1977 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 2020,
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Community nationals may also be denied full protection
of their Community rights where a member state refuses to
recognize the precedence of Community law over national
law.' 9 6 In Cohn-Bendit v. Minister of the Interior, Cohn-Bendit, a
German citizen residing in France, had participated in a stu-
dent revolt.197 French authorities concluded that his presence
threatened the "ordre public" and consequently deported
him.' 98 Cohn-Bendit subsequently sought reentry into France
in order to accept an offer of employment. 99 His request was
denied and Cohn-Bendit instituted proceedings. 20 The Paris
Tribunal 20 ' referred questions regarding Council Directive
No. 64/221 to the Court of Justice.2 °2 However, the Conseil
d'Etat203 claimed that neither directives nor regulations have
direct effect in matters of public policy. 2 4 It held that the Paris
Tribunal was incorrect in referring this matter to the Court
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8441, at 7961 (Opinion of
the Advocate General) (stating that it would be incorrect to hold that particular ac-
tion or inaction on the part of a national court could never constitute a failure of a
state to fulfill a Treaty obligation) with Mertens de Wilmars & Verougstraete, Proceed-
ings Against Member State for Failure to Fulfil Their Obligations, 7 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
385, 389-90 (1970) (concluding that a particular judicial action by a national court
can never constitute a failure of a member state to fulfill a Treaty obligation but
conceding that such a failure might be found where a national court refuses to refer
to the Court of Justice where required to do so).
However, in order for article 169 to be invoked against a member state on the
basis of wrongdoing on the part of one of its courts, the national court must have
deliberately disregarded Community law. "Judicial error, whether due to the misap-
prehension of facts or to misapprehension of the law, is not a breach of the Treaty."
Bouchereau, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2020, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8441, at 7962 (Opinion of the Advocate General).
196. See G. van den Berghe, supra note 32, at 24. Germany, France, and Italy are
still resistant to the supremacy of Community law. Id.; see Rutili, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. at 1229, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, at 7777.
197. Dec. 22, 1978, Conseil d'Etat, Fr., 1979 Dalloz-Sirey,Jurisprudence 155. For
a rendition of the facts of this case in English, see Simon & Dowrick, supra note 179,
at 376-79.
198. Simon & Dowrick, supra note 179, at 376.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 376-77.
201. The Paris Tribunal is a regional administrative court. See id. at 377.
202. Id. "[B]y submitting these questions to the European Court ofJustice, the
Paris Tribunal had implicitly recognized the right of Community nationals to invoke
Community Directive provisions before a national court and therefore acknowledged
their self-executing character." Id. at 377-78.
203. The Conseil d'Etat is the supreme administrative court in France. See id. at
376.
204. Id. at 378-79; see 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 1, at 5-618.
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and consequently annulled the judgment. °5 The judgment of
the Conseil d'Etat was in fact erroneous as it disregarded prior
Community law which held directives to be directly applicable
to member states.20 6
A situation such as Cohn-Bendit where a national authority
blatently disregards the superiority of Community law is rare.
Nevertheless, the Community judicial system allows national
courts too much discretion and thereby fails to fully safeguard
the rights of Community nationals.20 7
The legal protection of Community nationals can be sub-
stantially and simply enhanced. In order to assure that public
policy is properly and uniformly interpreted and applied by na-
tional authorities, the Court of Justice should be given limited
jurisdiction to review cases involving this concept. 208 The
right of member states to invoke this reservation could be con-
ditioned upon consent to submit to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court if the state's action is challenged.20 9 The highly
discretionary and potentially discriminatory nature of this res-
ervation warrants review by the Court ofJustice. 210 However,
this limited grant of jurisdiction should extend to no other ar-
eas of Community law.
CONCLUSION
The principles of free movement of workers and freedom
of establishment are essential to achieve the objectives of the
European Economic Community. These principles infringe
upon the traditional right of a sovereign state to control its
domestic state of affairs. The public policy exception provided
205. Simon & Dowrick, supra note 179, at 379.
206. Rutili, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1229-30, [1975 Trahsfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, at 7777; van Duyn, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1348,
[1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8283, at 7226; Simon &
Dowrick, supra note 179, at 379-82.
207. See generally H. SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES (1976) (comprehensive study of the Community judicial system).
208. Cf Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing
the Guardianship of Infants (Neth. v. Swed.) 1958 I.C.J. 55, 100 (Judgement of Nov.
28) (Separate opinion of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht) (addressing whether Swe-
den, a party to the Convention Governing the Guardianship of Infants could impose
on foreign guardians restrictions based on "ordre public" as defined in Swedish law).
209. See id.
210. See id.
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in articles 48 and 56 reserves to the individual member states
some control over its borders. Due to its ambiguity, the excep-
tion gives member states broader discretion than was in-
tended. National authorities could abuse this ambiguity in or-
der to discriminate against workers of other member states.
This possibility is enhanced by the fact that Community na-
tionals are inadequately protected by Community law.
Because it is implausible to precisely define public policy
in the context of the free movement of workers, the discretion
of member states must be reduced by limiting the scope of the
public policy exception. Of primary importance is that the pol-
icy be genuine and be directed at nationals and nonnationals
alike. Furthermore, the application of the exception should be
limited to the refusal of entry, to employment related cases,
and to exceptional circumstances where national treatment
would not suffice.
By narrowing the scope of the public policy exception as
well as granting limited appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Justice, unauthorized discrimination against Community na-
tionals would be eliminated within the Community. Further-
more, the Court would not be unduly burdened since relatively
few cases would involve the exception if the suggested restric-
tions were adopted.
Lori Wood
